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RELIABILITY MATTERS: REASSOCIATING
BA GLEY MATERIALITY, STRICKLAND
PREJUDICE, AND CUMULATIVE
HARMLESS ERROR
JOHN H. BLUME & CHRISTOPHER SEEDS*
INTRODUCTION
Certain errors.., are like apples, while others.., are like oranges. Both share the
same shape (they are errors), but they have decidedly different textures, colors, and
tastes, making it extremely difficult to judge their combined effect on the jury.I
Categories are made, not found .... [O]ur categories do not derive from the shape of
the world but create it.
2
Most commonly invoked after conviction and direct appeal, when a
defendant may claim that his lawyer was ineffective or that the government
failed to disclose exculpatory information, the Brady3 doctrine, which
governs the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense,
and the Strickland' doctrine, which monitors defense counsel's duty to
represent the client effectively, have developed into the principal safeguards
of fair trials, fundamental to the protection of defendants' constitutional
rights and arguably defendants' strongest insurance of a reliable verdict.5
But the doctrines do not sufficiently protect these core values.
. John H. Blume is Associate Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and Director of
the Cornell Death Penalty Project. Christopher Seeds is a former Deputy Capital Defender
at the New York State Capital Defender Office. The authors thank Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Johnson, and Trevor Morrison for their helpful comments.
1 Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 377 n.55 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
2 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 27 (2000).
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985).
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
5 Between 1975 and 1993, appellate courts found reversible error in 68% of the capital
cases they reviewed, with 81% resulting in different outcomes upon relitigation at the trial
level. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART I: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (2000), available at http://ccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/
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The doctrines, despite their common due process heritage and
symbiotic development, are generally divided when assessing prejudice.
Even in cases where the defendant alleges both that the prosecution
withheld evidence and that his counsel was incompetent, courts assess the
impact of each party's conduct on the verdict independently. Our
objectives here are two-fold. Our more modest objective is to argue that
courts should consider the impact of Brady violations and Strickland
violations together when evaluating whether a guilty verdict or death
sentence is reliable. Without considering their simultaneous impact on
jurors, the reliability of a verdict cannot fairly be measured. A divide-and-
conquer approach is inconsistent with reliability, the touchstone of both
doctrines. This is important because the Brady and Strickland doctrines,
besides being the most commonly raised types of post-conviction error,
govern the core functions of the main players in the adversarial system.
Few courts, and no commentators, however, have directly tackled this issue.
Our second objective is more ambitious. If Strickland and Brady
errors should be considered jointly when assessing prejudice, then why
shouldn't the impact of all errors that potentially affect the reliability of a
verdict be taken into account? By this, we mean errors that affect the
information the jury considers and errors that affect the manner in which the
jury considers the information it receives: denials of expert assistance,6
denials of the right to confront one's accuser,7 and prosecutorial misconduct
that skews the factual presentation, to name a few. Such a global reliability
inquiry is the alleged goal of cumulative harmless error doctrine, a branch
of due process analysis addressing claims for relief based on multiple errors
that do not warrant relief in isolation. But while cumulative harmless error
analysis could provide a vehicle for overarching inquiry, the doctrine is
inconsistently and rarely applied. Fears that fundamental fairness
determinations could swamp other rules of criminal procedure, or displace
state interests in finality in favor of omnipresent federal review, motivate
courts to narrow the cumulative-error calculus. For example, many courts
exclude suppression of evidence or mistakes by defense counsel,
categorizing them as non-errors if they fail to satisfy the Strickland or
Brady prejudice requirements. A verdict's reliability cannot sensibly be
measured by assessing deficiencies of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct,
finrep.pdf. Together, errors of ineffective representation by defense counsel and
prosecutorial suppression of evidence accounted for 55% of those reversals. See generally
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR IN
CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, at app. C-4 (2002), available at
http://ccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/dpstudey/appendixliebman2.pdf.
6 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
7 See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
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and any other errors affecting reliability in isolation from one another.
Such a procrustean, divide-and-conquer approach sacrifices reliability. It
preserves verdicts, but guarantees that many of them will be unreliable. In
sum, reliability cannot be assessed piecemeal.
Part I begins by tracing the history of the Strickland and Brady
doctrines. We focus on three defining moments. The first is the United
States Supreme Court's decision in the well-known case of Powell v.
Alabama, which established a criminal defendant's right to counsel as a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same legal precept the Court relied on in prior cases where
the prosecution withheld or presented false evidence. The second is the
initial development of prejudice standards to govern failures of defense
counsel and prosecutorial suppression, highlighted by Brady v. Maryland,
which put forth the materiality requirement for suppression errors, and
Gideon v. Wainwright, in which the Supreme Court (while delivering the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states) adhered to the due-process
roots of the right it recognized in Powell. The third and culminating
moment is the Supreme Court's creation during its 1984-85 term of the
mirror-image prejudice standards for ineffective assistance of counsel and
suppression claims in Strickland and in United States v. Bagley,
respectively. This history shows that laws governing the right to counsel
and suppression of evidence have long shared the same core value,
reliability of outcomes, and have long applied a broadly inclusive measure
of error, totality-of-the-circumstances review, to effectuate it. The
historical discussion ends with a look at recent precedent, which
emphasizes that totality-of-the-circumstances review as applied in
Strickland and Bagley is a cumulative consideration. Together, the
doctrines' history and character anchor our argument.
Beginning with Part II we address three problems that we see as
dividing reliability determinations. The first, failure to cumulate defense
counsel errors in Strickland prejudice analysis, is really a non-problem.
The Court's recent decisions applying Strickland show that with respect to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims defense counsel's conduct "taken as
a whole" must be considered in assessing prejudice. 8 Still, we think it is
significant to point out this trend that divides reliability determinations in
some courts. In the process, we see flawed reasoning that will reemerge
later when we discuss cumulative harmless error doctrine.
We next consider the relationship between the Brady and Strickland
doctrines, in Part III. Our call is for integrating Strickland prejudice and
8 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
398-99 (2000).
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Bagley materiality. To some what we call for may seem obvious: a totality
of the circumstances test, which both Strickland and Bagley are, surely
takes into account everything that the jury should have heard if the system
had worked properly. Considering suppression missteps in the Strickland
prejudice prong, and evaluating defense counsel's errors in assessing
Bagley materiality is, therefore, already written in the law. But others may
see a difficulty: how can a due process violation (Brady/Bagley) combine
with a Sixth Amendment violation (Strickland) to invalidate a conviction?
What would such a hybrid be called? Integrating the prejudice arising from
suppression and ineffective-assistance is inherent in the Bagley and
Strickland standards. Both are totality of the circumstances standards
derived from due process; the Bagley and Strickland standards reflect the
same core constitutional value, reliability. That the doctrines presently
reside under different constitutional amendments with traditionally different
focuses, we argue, is ultimately of little concern. Considering suppressed
evidence within the contour of Strickland prejudice, or defense-counsel
failures in the context of Bagley materiality, is only being true to the
function of each, to guarantee reliable verdicts.
Part IV expands the argument for cumulation beyond ineffective
assistance of counsel and prosecutorial suppression. Embarking upon our
second objective, we consider the obstacles to unified reliability
determination posed by cumulative harmless error analysis. We advocate
including all errors at the trial that impact verdict reliability in the scope of
cumulative error analysis. The same reason for integrating Strickland and
Brady prejudice--that reliability cannot be measured piecemeal-supports
unifying the prejudice associated with other errors that threaten reliability.
We propose an approach that need not conflict with justified limits on
collateral review.
Courts frequently assess reliability in pieces, considering the impact of
a portion of errors, rather than assessing how the panoply of trial errors
affect the reliability of a verdict overall. Our call here is for a rule of
integration requiring courts to consider the unified impact on the verdict of
all errors affecting reliability.
I. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF BAGLEYAND
STRICKLAND
In general terms, this article concerns what errors can and ought to be
considered together in determining reliability. A necessary starting point,
then, is identifying what errors affect the reliability of a verdict. This is a
question that, starting on a blank slate, would merit exploration with respect
to every conceivable error. But we are not on a blank slate. We draw on
[Vol. 951156
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hundreds of years of precedent, in which errors have already been defined.
Among the current mechanisms in the law for gauging the reliability of
verdicts, three are prominent: the Brady doctrine, which governs
prosecutorial suppression; the Strickland doctrine, which governs
performance of defense counsel; and cumulative harmless error analysis,
which accumulates errors, alone harmless, to assess whether their collective
effect undermines the fairness of the proceedings. Rather than set off on a
free-form journey to define reliability-impacting errors, therefore, we
examine the state of reliability assessment, focusing on the success or
failure of these doctrines.
It is our position that reliability has meaning only when assessed
globally. If divided, considered error by error, one cannot measure it. If
one focused on the reliability-impact of each individual error, one would, in
essence, fail to see the forest for the trees. A forest may remain a forest if it
misses one or two trees, but if it misses enough trees its essential character
is hopelessly distorted. So it is with reliable verdicts. Some errors may not
sabotage the reliability of a verdict in and of themselves, but it cannot fairly
be said that a verdict's reliability is intact without assessing the impact of
all the errors together.
Our position thus relies on a link between verdicts' reliability as a core
aspiration and global scope of review as its measure. : Seeking the former,
one must employ the latter. A verdict cannot be partly reliable. Later, we
advance the argument that it should be of no moment whether a verdict is
not reliable as a result of counsel's deficient performance, the prosecutor's
withholding of favorable information, a combination of the two, or a
combination of even more errors that affect reliability; if errors alike impact
the reliability of the verdict, it makes sense to consider them collectively.
The history of the Brady and Strickland doctrines establishes this. As the
Brady and Strickland history shows commonalities between doctrines, it
also reveals something about reliability as it pertains to verdicts: that
reliability is by nature a global consideration.
A. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BAGLEY AND STRICKLAND
9
9 There are many types of prosecutorial misconduct violations, just as there are many
types of denial of the right to counsel and, among those, many types of ineffective assistance
of counsel. We concentrate on ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's
failures and prosecutorial misconduct in the form of suppression of evidence.
Ineffectiveness claims in which the Strickland rule applies are distinct from the narrower
categories of right-to-counsel cases in which circumstances render the trial "presumptively
unreliable" and prejudice is presumed: denial of counsel, state interference with the right to
counsel, and counsel bound by a conflict of interest. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 658-59, 659 n.26 (1984) ("There are... circumstances that are so likely to prejudice
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It is not easy to sum up seventy years of precedent, particularly the
development of law as fluctuating and diverse as that of ineffective
assistance of counsel. What we endeavor to do in the following pages,
however, is to show that throughout all of the changes-the shifts between
the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, shifts between various articulations
of a standard-the scope of the factual review in determining effectiveness
the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified .... Apart
from circumstances of that magnitude, however, there is generally no basis for finding a
Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel
undermined the reliability of the [trial]."); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 ("Actual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice.").
Regarding denial of counsel, see Bell v. Cone, 635 U.S. 685, 697-98 (2002) (declining
to extend presumption to capital case where defense counsel failed to investigate and present
mitigating evidence and waived sentencing-phase closing argument); Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (same where counsel failed to file notice of appeal); Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288-89 (2000) (same where appellate counsel failed to file merits
brief). Regarding state interference, see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91-92 (1976)
(defense counsel not permitted to confer with client during overnight mid-trial recess);
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (state statute barred summation by defense
counsel). Regarding conflict of interest, compare Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166
(2002) (reiterating that defendant must show counsel's conflict "actually affected the
adequacy of his representation"), and Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980)
(same), with Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1978) (reversal automatic where
court requires joint representation over defendant's objection). See generally, e.g., Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance
of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REv. 425, 440-55 (1996)
(discussing different types of cases where courts have not required showing of prejudice
before finding ineffective assistance of counsel).
On the distinction between various types of prosecutorial misconduct violations, see
Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1298, 1299, 1304
(1988) ("The approach employed depends on the type of misconduct involved .... [O]ne
uses such analysis to define the due process violation itself [e.g., Brady], while the other
relies on more traditional concepts of fairness to define due process violations and restricts
its use of outcome-determinative analysis as a harmless error test to determine whether a
given due process violation requires reversal of the defendant's conviction [e.g.,
inappropriate summation]."). Fisher recognizes that suppression and false presentation of
evidence violations, see, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), have a built-in
prejudice element whereas other prosecutorial misconduct errors, see, e.g., Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-83 (1986) (alleged improper comments made by a prosecutor
during closing argument), do not. Fisher, supra, at 1304.
Other types of prosecutorial misconduct violations include the knowing presentation of
false evidence, see Napue, 360 U.S. at 272; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110 (1935);
and summation misconduct, see Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 ("[A] relevant question is whether
the prosecutors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process."') (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,
643 (1974)). As we discuss in section II.A., the due process violation for suppression of
evidence developed from the doctrine regulating the knowing presentation of false evidence.
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of counsel has always taken into account the totality of the circumstances.
The same is true with respect to the prosecutorial misconduct jurisprudence
dealing with suppression of evidence. The core constitutional value at stake
in both, moreover, is and has always been the reliability of the underlying
verdict. We focus on three areas: the doctrines' due process roots, first
standards of prejudice for both doctrines, and then the creation of the
Strickland prejudice and Bagley materiality standards.
1. Due Process Roots
In the 1930's, the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases that provide
the first solid foundations of the modem rules guaranteeing the right to the
meaningful assistance of counsel and prohibiting prosecutorial misconduct
through withholding evidence. It resolved both under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first was the well-known case of Powell v. Alabama, which arose
after three black teenagers were sentenced to death for the rape of two white
women in a small Alabama town. 10 The defendants, from out of state and
illiterate, faced a single-day trial before an all-white jury.1 Without asking
the defendants if they had a lawyer or means to employ one, the trial court
purported to appoint the entire local bar to represent the defendants; but no
one working on the defendants' behalf investigated'and no attorney in
defense showed at trial.' 2 The Court's opinion resonated with the need for a
minimum level of effectiveness by counsel, holding that the trial court's
failure to make an effective appointment of counsel denied the defendants
due process. 13  Due process requires notice and hearing, the Court
concluded; and a hearing "has always included the right to the aid of
counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right., 14 What
ultimately carried the day in Powell was not just the trial court's failure to
10 See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
(1969); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
11 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
12 Id. at 52, 58.
'3 Id. at 65.
"4 Id. at 68. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed its prior findings of right-to-
counsel violations rooted in the due process clause. See id. at 69-70 (citing Kelley v.
Oregon, 273 U.S. 589, 591 (1927); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); Frank
v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906); Exparte
Hidekuni, 219 F. 610, 611 (S.D. Cal. 1915); Exparte Riggins, 134 F. 404, 418 (N.D. Ala.
1904)). The Court also cited a number of state cases standing for the proposition that the
right to counsel is fundamental in character and therefore essential to due process of law
(Powell, 287 U.S. at 70), and noted that twelve of the original thirteen colonies recognized
the right for anyone accused of a felony. Id. at 59-70.
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appoint counsel who would actually represent the defendants, or even the
fact that the trial took place three weeks after the defendants' arrest.
Rather, the court considered the racist mob gathered outside the courthouse
and the defendants' ignorance and utter helplessness. Taken together, these
factors made it very likely that the jury's verdict was unreliable and resulted
in a denial of due process.
15
Three years after Powell, the Court decided Mooney v. Holohan,6
which initiated a line of due-process cases focusing on "the special role
played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal
trials.' 17  Mooney found the trial fundamentally unfair because the
prosecution deliberately suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant and
then presented perjured testimony. Like Powell, it found the fundamental
fairness requirement in the Due Process Clause. Like Powell, the Mooney
Court also addressed the impact of the prosecutor's actions on the ultimate
integrity of the verdict in light of the totality of the circumstances.'
8
2. First Development of Prejudice Standards
Powell and Mooney, not surprisingly, encouraged other defendants to
challenge their convictions, and in many cases their death sentences, on the
ground that they had been denied due process. As courts confronted these
cases, most determined that not all false-evidence or right-to-counsel
violations warranted a new trial. Thus a variety of prejudice standards
emerged. Through these varied articulations, and even as the right to
15 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 ("In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this
opinion-the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of
public hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the
military forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and
communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril
of their lives-we think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and
opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.... But passing that, and
assuming their inability, even if opportunity had been given, to employ counsel, as the trial
court evidently did assume, we are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the
necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an
effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
16 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
18 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. As the Court later explained, "the principle in Mooney v.
Holohan is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding
prosecutor's conscious failure to correct false testimony violated due process).
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counsel was increasingly enforced under the Sixth Amendment, the due-
process nature of the prejudice inquiry remained.
This is relatively straightforward with respect to the law governing
false evidence and suppression. After Mooney, the Supreme Court
announced that the knowing presentation of false evidence violated due
process if there was a "reasonable likelihood [that the false testimony]
affected the judgment of the jury."'19 Then in Brady v. Maryland, the Court
analogized the knowing presentation of false evidence to the prosecution's
duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused: Brady focused on a
withheld statement exculpating the defendant, which defense counsel
discovered only after Brady had been convicted and sentenced to death.2 °
The Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution. 2 a  Brady established "materiality" as an
element of the constitutional error, but did not define it.22 Throughout the
late sixties and early seventies, lower courts adopted varied definitions of
the term.23
19 Napue, 360 U.S. at 271-72; see also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957)
(remanding for retrial where prosecutor withheld information regarding a witness and
encouraged misleading testimony which was "seriously prejudicial" to the defendant).
20 373 U.S. at 84. For a discussion of developments in caselaw leading up to the
Supreme Court's decision in Brady, see Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 136-45 (1964).
21 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
22 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 703 n.5 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
generally Victor Bass, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose,
40 U. Cm. L. REv. 112, 125-31 (1973) (criticizing Brady because it "provides no clear
standard to which the prosecutor can conform," and suggests that "[t]he word 'material,' as
used in the Brady holding, should be taken to mean simply 'relevant"'). Questions arose, for
example, as to whether the Brady materiality was synonymous with the Chapman harmless
error standard, or more or less demanding; questions also arose as to whether the prosecution
had a duty to turn over information it considered favorable without prompting or with only a
general request from the defense. See, e.g., id at 136; Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and
the Accused. Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-98
(1960); Note, supra note 20; see also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 101 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
23 Most acknowledged that Brady derived from the Napue line, see, e.g., Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), which has a "reasonable
likelihood" standard, and described materiality in terms of its likely effect on the verdict,
using phrases such as "reasonable possibility," "reasonably likely," "significant chance," or
simply, "might." See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused
and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1146 n.46 (1982) (collecting
cases).
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The development of a prejudice standard for right-to-counsel
violations was more circuitous due to unresolved question about the Sixth
24Amendment's applicability to the states. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment guarantee to counsel in
criminal prosecutions to state defendants.25  In doing so, the majority
recognized the fundamental character of the right to counsel, and saw
Powell as "ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the
Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from
federal abridgement are equally protected against state invasion by the
Fourteenth Amendment.,
26
As the due process, fundamental nature of the right to counsel endured,
so did totality of the circumstances review. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals coined the due process "farce and mockery"
standard that every federal circuit adopted at some point over the next thirty
24 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling in part Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)). Compare id. at 59-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), with id.
at 68-92 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1950) (supporting Justice Frankfurter's
view); John Raeburn Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 46 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1948) (supporting Justice Black's view). See generally Yale
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most
Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1963).
25 372 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1963). Six years after Powell, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment guaranteed counsel in all federal criminal prosecutions. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938). But four years later in Betts v. Brady, it rejected an invitation to impose the
same requirement on the States. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); accord Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); cf Bute, 333 U.S. at 674 ("[I]f these charges
had been capital charges, the court would have been required, both by the state statute and
the decisions of this Court interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, to take some such steps
[appointing counsel]."). Betts said Powell's holding was limited to its facts and that the right
to counsel was not so fundamental as to require a bright-line rule of appointment. 316 U.S.
at 465, 471. According to Betts, the Fourteenth Amendment required only that states
provide counsel on a case-by-case basis, where denial of counsel would be a "denial of
fundamental fairness and shocking to a universal sense of justice." Id. at 462. Compare id,
with McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (finding denial of due process), Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948), White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945), and Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945). See generally Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court,
Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAuL L. REv. 213, 225-30 (1959)
(discussing Supreme Court application of Betts rule). Betts left federal defendants, availed
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, with more protection than state defendants, who
could call only upon the due process right to counsel defined in Powell.
26 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341. The majority overruled the Court's previous decision in
Betts v. Brady because Betts "departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court's
holding in Powell v. Alabama rested." Id. at 345; see also id. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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years.27 The inquiry was grounded, as Powell, in the fundamental fairness
concerns of the due process clause and focused on "the proceedings as a
whole," not merely the isolated "mistakes of counsel. 28
After Gideon, a shift toward the Sixth Amendment began, as notions
of effectiveness of counsel and a more robust adversarial process
increasingly came to the fore.29 At the time the Supreme Court issued what
27 Citing both right-to-counsel and false-evidence cases in support, the D.C. Circuit held
that attorney conduct did not violate due process unless the impact was so "extreme" that
under the "circumstances surrounding the trial" it "shocked the conscience of the court and
made the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice." Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-
70 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)); see Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at
431 n.31.
2 Diggs, 148 F.2d at 670. As one commentator describes: "[A]s a practical matter the
only remedy for inadequate representation has been to vacate otherwise valid convictions.
As a result, the courts have been more concerned with the fairness of the proceedings taken
as a whole than with the obligations of counsel. The mockery-of-justice standard simply
reflects the view that the policy of finality in criminal cases so outweighs the consequences
of inferior defense work that only the most serious errors and omissions by counsel deprive
the defendant of a fair trial." Harvey E. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in
Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 929 (1973); see, e.g.,
Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1966); Scott v. United States, 334 F.2d 72, 72
(6th Cir. 1964); Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1962); United States ex
rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir. 1959); Newsome v. Smyth, 261 F.2d 452,
454 (4th Cir. 1958); Anderson v. Barman, 250 F.2d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 1958); Taylor v.
United States, 283 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d
Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-981 (7th Cir. 1948);
Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Diggs, 148 F.2d 667.
29 During this time, courts abandoned the farce and mockery standard. See, e.g., Trapnell
v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1983). The court that created it, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, replaced it with a standard of "gross incompetence."
Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Fifth Circuit, which later
decided Strickland, shifted to a requirement of "counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance." Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir.
1970) (per curiam) (quoting MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960)); see
Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974) (recreating the farce-mockery standard
in the frame of MacKenna, 280 F.2d 592: "The two tests [farce-mockery and reasonably
effective assistance] can be reconciled. The governing standard is reasonably effective
assistance. One method of determining whether counsel has rendered reasonably effective
assistance is to ask whether the proceedings were a farce or mockery. The farce-mockery
test is but one criterion for determining if an accused has received the constitutionally
required minimum representation .... One may receive ineffective assistance of counsel
even though the proceedings have not been a farce or mockery."); see, e.g., Kirchmeier,
supra note 9, at 432:
An impetus for this change in competency standards [from the farce and mockery standard to
reasonably competent assistance] was the Supreme Court's decisions in several cases, including
Gideon, which shifted the focus in right to counsel cases from the "fair trial" Due Process
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many view as its first statement on "effectiveness" in McMann v.
Richardson (stating in dicta that "it has long been recognized that the right
to counsel is the right to effective counsel"),3 ° courts long receptive to the
notion increasingly applied the principle by standards that demanded
"reasonable" rather than "farcical" representation.3' Still, questions
remained regarding how to articulate the standard of performance, whether
there should be a prejudice requirement for inadequate assistance of counsel
claims,32 and if so, what the standard should be.33 But as the courts applied
standard of the Fifth Amendment to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the application of
that right to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See also Bines, supra note 28, at 929 (arguing that the absence of another remedy "le[ft] a
criminal defendant without an enforceable right to effective representation"); Bruce Andrew
Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1053 (1980) (suggesting the farce and strict standard may never have developed, had
Betts extended the Sixth Amendment to the States, and thus initiated a shift in focus from
fairness to specific performance); Joel Jay Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1973).
30 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446
(1940)).
31 See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) ("reasonably
competent assistance"); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 804 (11th Cir. 1982)
("reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance"); Dyer v. Crisp,
613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) ("reasonably competent defense attorney"); United States
v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1122 (1st Cir. 1978) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Wilson
v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1978) ("reasonably effective assistance"); Cooper v.
Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) ("reasonably competent and effective
representation"); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) ("reasonably
competent attorney"); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1975) ("minimum standard of professional representation"); Herring, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th
Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) ("customary skill
and knowledge," "normal competency"); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968)
(listing various duties necessary to achieve effective assistance). See generally Richard P.
Rhodes, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital Defendant's Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121, 130-35 (1992).
32 At least one court said there should be no prejudice requirement. See Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974). Some courts applied a "harmless error"
test, placing the burden on the state to establish lack of prejudice. See, e.g., Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977); Coles, 389 F.2d at 224, 226; McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1974); see Bines, supra note 28, at 960-61 (discussing use of
Chapman standard for determining prejudice from ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
violations). Others placed the burden of demonstrating prejudice on the defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane). The Supreme Court
showed signed of favoring a prejudice showing. In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361
(1981), the Court held that regardless of whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was violated when federal agents interviewed the defendant prior to trial without
counsel's knowledge or consent, the proper remedy was not dismissal of the indictment
unless prejudice was shown. The Court noted that "[t]he premise of our prior cases is that
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the right to effective counsel, as it was increasingly called, the due process
roots of the right remained visible in the various standards: courts applying
a prejudice requirement applied a totality of the circumstances review and
cumulated counsel's mistakes.34
3. Creation of the Strickland and Bagley Standards
By the late seventies and early eighties, a variety of standards
regulated the performance of prosecution and defense counsel. During the
1984 and 1985 terms, the Supreme Court weighed in. It began in Strickland
v. Washington by acknowledging the principles of equality and fairness
underlying the adversary system, 35 and by emphasizing the relationship
between the right to counsel and the due process right to a fair trial: "The
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it
defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause...."
36
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness," the Court
reasoned, "must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial system that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result. 3 7
The two-prong test the Strickland Court set forth requires both
deficient performance by counsel and a showing of prejudice.38 Rejecting
the constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect upon the
effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced some other prejudice to the
defense. Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for
imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the
defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial." Id. at 365.
33 See generally Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 896-900 (5th Cir. 1982)
(canvassing positions of all circuit courts of appeals).
34 See, e.g., Trapnell, 725 F.2d 149; United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Cooper, 586 F.2d at 1333; United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1976); McQueen, 498 F.2d at 218-
220; Scott, 427 F.2d at 610; United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597, 600-02 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Pope, 590
P.2d 859, 865-66 (Cal. 1979); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Mass.
1974).
3' 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial
system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is
necessary to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to
which they are entitled.") (quotation omitted).
36 Id. at 696; see id. at 684 ("The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is
needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.").
31 Id. at 686.
38 The deficient-performance prong of the Strickland test asks whether defense counsel's
performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The
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harmless-error and newly-discovered-evidence prejudice standards, 39 the
Court looked to one of its recent prosecutorial misconduct cases, United
States v. Agurs.40  The Court announced that a defendant has incurred
objective-reasonableness standard is measured by "prevailing norms of practice," such as the
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice. Id. In applying the objective-
reasonableness standard, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was
reasonable. Id.
39 The Supreme Court was confronted with two very different approaches to assessing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Washington v. Strickland, a panel of the then-
Fifth Circuit held that the proper standard for assessing the impact of defense counsel's poor
performance was whether "but for ... counsel's ineffectiveness [defendant's] trial, but not
necessarily its outcome, would have been altered in a way helpful to him." 673 F.2d 879,
902 (5th Cir. 1982). Upon that showing, the burden would shift to the state to show the error
was harmless. Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
The en banc court adopted a different standard. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d
1243 (5th Cir. 1982). Looking to a Supreme Court case holding that prejudice was required
for reversal where the state deported a defense witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
458 U.S. 858, 866-67 (1982) (interpreting compulsory process clause), the court noted that
"virtually any new piece of favorable evidence produced by a petitioner at a habeas hearing
may be 'helpful to him."' Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1262. The court was also concerned that
the government should not bear responsibility for errors it had no part in and that any burden
of proof placed on the state would skew procedural default requirements on collateral
review. Id. at 1261 ("[W]here ineffectiveness is predicated upon the failure of counsel to
raise certain objections, application of the Chapman rule would relieve petitioner of the
requirement that he show prejudice before he can raise those objections on collateral
review."). It therefore applied the prejudice standard needed to avoid procedural default in
habeas corpus-that a defendant must "show that ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in
actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense." Id. at 1262 (adopting the
interpretation of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) ("cause and prejudice"
requirement)); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)).
40 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the Supreme Court carved the Brady doctrine into three
separate categories, each governed by a different standard of materiality: the first,
characterized by the knowing presentation of false testimony, was governed by the standard
enunciated in Napue; the second involved situations where the defendant specifically
requested information from the prosecution, which it failed to produce; and the third was a
situation, as in Agurs, where counsel made a general request for favorable information, or no
request at all, and the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory information. 1d. at 103-07.
The court concluded that in general request situations, "if the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed." 1d.
at 112. The false testimony standard, appropriate for the first scenario and apparently for the
second, could not apply to Agurs' situation, the Court anticipated, because it would require
an open file policy by every prosecutor. Id. at 109. For the same reason, the Court held,
customary harmless error standards should not apply. Id. at 111-12 (citing Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)
(requiring prosecution to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained"). On the other hand, the Court recognized that the
strict outcome-determinative test used in newly-discovered-evidence cases was too strict,
with it "there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the
cause of justice." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111.
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prejudice warranting a new trial when "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."4 1  "In making this
determination," the Court emphasized, "a court hearing an ineffectiveness
claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury., 42
The next term, in United States v. Bagley, the Court redefined Brady
materiality in terms of Strickland prejudice.43 Noting that prior precedent
had not defined a standard for the specific-request situation,4 the Court
looked instead to other contexts in which the fact-finder was deprived of
information: ineffective assistance of counsel 45 and deportation of defense
witnesses.46 Adopting the prejudice standards from those cases, the Court
held that "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." "A 'reasonable probability,"' it reiterated, "is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 47
By adopting a standard identical to Strickland, the Court signaled
recognition of the need for balance between the rules governing the conduct
of the prosecution and defense counsel.48 And its opinion emphasized the
significance of the adversaries' relationship:
41 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court also relied on the test for materiality of
testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of a witness,
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872-74, which mirrors the Agurs test.
42 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96.
4' 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Bagley also held that impeachment evidence is like any other
exculpatory evidence for Brady purposes. Id. at 676-77 (recalling Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (false evidence case in which witness lied when asked whether he
had been promised anything in return for assisting government)).
4 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681 & n.12. The Ninth Circuit had applied a false-evidence
prejudice standard in determining that the prosecution's failure to divulge impeachment
evidence that defense counsel specifically was reversible error. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719
F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding suppression of impeachment evidence was
especially egregious "because it threatens the defendant's right to confront adverse
witnesses").
45 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
46 United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982).
" Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
41 Id. at 682-83. Following Agurs, one commentator noted that to preserve equality and
truthfulness in the adversary system, courts would have to compensate for what she
perceived to be a lax duty on prosecutors by holding defense counsel to higher standards of
performance. "By easing the Brady standard," she said, "courts have increased the
importance of providing effective assistance of counsel to the accused." Babcock, supra
note 23, at 1163. Anticipating Strickland, she added that "[w]hen the Court finally fully
treats effective assistance, it must do so in light of... Agurs." Id. at 1165. Given Agurs, she
continued, "a weak ineffective assistance requirement means that no one is systematically
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[U]nder the Strickland formulation the reviewing court may consider directly any
adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the
preparation or presentation of the defendant's case. The reviewing court should
assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the
circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial
proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense49
not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response.
A Brady violation alone, the Court acknowledged, could eviscerate
defense counsel's ability to adequately prepare and present a case.50
Defense counsel performance was thus integral to the materiality
determination.
B. THE "COLLECTIVE" CHARACTER OF STRICKLAND PREJUDICE AND
BAGLEY MATERIALITY
In Kyles v. Whitley, a majority of the Supreme Court held that a federal
court erroneously isolated suppressed pieces of evidence in analyzing
materiality.5 1  For Bagley materiality, the Court explained, "suppressed
evidence [must be] considered collectively, not item-by-item., 52
Considering the "net effect"53 of the suppressed evidence in Kyles, the
Court was "not... confident that the jury's verdict would have been the
same."
54
[C]onfidence that the verdict would have been unaffected cannot survive when
suppressed evidence would have [1] entitled a jury to find that the eyewitnesses were
not consistent in describing the killer, [2] that two out of the four eyewitnesses
testifying were unreliable, [3] that the most damning physical evidence was subject to
suspicion, [4] that the investigation that produced it was insufficiently probing, and
[5] that the principal police witness was insufficiently informed or candid.
55
Kyles thus put to rest any notion that the significance of evidentiary
items withheld from the defense and the jury could be assessed in
isolation.56
responsible for assuring that the factfinder hears evidence favorable to an accused." Id. at
1167. The Court found the standard adopted in Bagley sufficiently flexible to account for
that. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
4' Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83.
50 Id. at 668.
5' 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995).
52 Id. at 437 n.10.
13 Id. at 437.
14 Id. at 454 n.22.
51 Id. at 453.
56 The Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of the Brady doctrine, Banks v.
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), in which the Court considers considering the collective
materiality of suppressed evidence, reinforces Kyles.
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Following Kyles, it seems a given that the prejudice arising from
individual errors of defense counsel must also be considered together. And
the Supreme Court's most recent ineffective assistance of counsel decisions
reinforce, as the Court suggested in Bagley,57 that cumulating deficiencies is
the appropriate and intended practice under Strickland.58 In both Williams
v. Taylor5 9 and Wiggins v. Smith,6 ° the Court reversed based on multiple
failures of defense counsel during the penalty phase of a capital trial. In
Williams, the Court held that the trial judge was correct to conclude that
"the entire postconviction records, viewed as a whole and cumulative of
mitigation evidence presented originally, raised 'a reasonable probability
that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different."'
61
The appellate court below, in contrast, had failed to consider all ways the
trial would have been different but for counsel's mistakes and thereby failed
to properly apply Strickland.62
In Wiggins, the Court quoted Williams to explain that it "evaluate[s]
the totality of the evidence-'both that adduced at trial and the evidence
adduced in habeas proceeding[s].'' 63 Then it asks: Would a competent,
reasonable attorney have introduced the evidence in admissible form?
Would defense counsel have changed their strategy and presentation based
on this discovery, for instance to prioritize it? 64 Only after answering these
questions, the Court said, should a court consider whether a jury confronted
with that presentation would have returned a different verdict or sentence.
65
"In assessing prejudice," the Court added, acknowledging the penalty-phase
context, "we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of
" In United States v. Bagley, the Court invoked Strickland as support for evaluating the
cumulative effect the prosecution's failure to disclose had on the defense. 473 U.S. 667, 683
(1983).
58 Indeed, Strickland's language indicates that cumulation begins in the first prong-that
deficient performance is itself an "overall" error: Strickland says the reviewing court must
"assess counsel's overall performance" to determine whether "identified acts and omissions
rise to the level of deficient performance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (emphasis added); cf Mark Peake, Hoots v. Allsbrook: The Fourth Circuit's
Application of the Strickland Test for Determining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims,
44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 598, 611 (1987) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96) (noting that
the Court "repeatedly used the plural form of the word 'error,"' in addition to the fact that
Court's decision emphasized the totality of the circumstances).
9 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
60 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
61 529 U.S. at 398-99.
62 Id. at 371, 394.
63 539 U.S. at 536 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98).
64 Id. at 535.
65 Id. at 534-36.
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available mitigating evidence.. ..,66 That evidence is "taken as a
whole. 67  Wiggins and Williams thus simply clarify what the Supreme
Court's language in Strickland already suggests.
The upshot of the preceding history is this: first, the Brady and
Strickland doctrines have a common goal-securing reliable verdicts;
second, the doctrines affect that goal by a common means-totality of the
circumstances review; third, there is an inherent logic in the use of totality
of the circumstances review as a measure of reliability.
Given this, when one looks at the way reliability is currently assessed
in many courts-at the myopic way, for instance, that the Bagley
materiality and Strickland prejudice standards are applied-it seems plain
that something is ,fundamentally wrong. As we will discuss in more detail
below, the issue of the verdict's reliability is often divided many times.
Defense counsel's various deficiencies may be viewed individually when
assessing prejudice. Prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel
context is almost always separated from the materiality inquiry arising from
a prosecutor's withholding of favorable information. And no court
currently examines all constitutional errors when gauging the reliability of a
verdict in a particular case. In many cases, defendants are informed that the
verdict is reliable, even though a series of mishaps or errors occurred; errors
which, from a common-sense perspective, call in question the integrity of
the jury's verdict. In short, courts have improperly beset the road to global
reliability with obstacles. In the following pages we consider how these
obstacles have undercut reliability determinations.68 We study three
situations in particular, pressure points in the current state of the law, where
there is resistance to cumulating reliability-impacting errors: first, the
cumulation of defense counsel errors within Strickland prejudice (Part II);
second, the integration of Strickland and Bagley errors within the Strickland
and Bagley prejudice prongs (Part III); and finally, the integration of the
impact of all reliability-impacting errors (Part IV).
66 Id. at 534.
617 Id. at 538.
68 Throughout the discussion we focus primarily on courts conducting collateral or post-
conviction review, i.e. review after trial, direct appeal as of right, and the initial request for
certiorari to the Supreme Court. We do so because in most jurisdictions a defendant cannot
challenge counsel's performance or the prosecutor's failure to disclose favorable information
until the case reaches collateral review. This is so for good reason: except in extraordinary
circumstances, both types of claims require additional factual development that extends
beyond the trial transcript.
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II. CUMULATING COUNSEL'S ERRORS IN THE STRICKLAND FRAMEWORK
This point ought not be controversial: errors in defense counsel's
performance should be cumulated in the Strickland prejudice prong. Recent
Supreme Court precedent has said this with clarity, yet some courts do not
do it. The approach to Strickland prejudice in the hypothetical mirrors the
Fifth Circuit's adjudication of a recent case, Banks v. Cockrell, in which the
defendant identified four shortcomings of defense counsel at the penalty
phase: (1) counsel failed to obtain a social history of Banks; (2) counsel
failed to prepare witnesses, including Banks's parents, to testify; (3)
counsel failed to present the expert testimony of a psychologist concerning
Banks's family background and future dangerousness; and (4) counsel
failed to interview one of the state's penalty-phase witnesses.69 The court
regrouped the allegations according to what it considered "related." It
analyzed the failure to investigate social history and to retain a psychologist
(1 and 3) as one failure. It identified the failure to prepare Banks's parents
and other witnesses (2) as another. And it considered defense counsel's
failure to interview a state's witness (4) as a third. The court then assessed
the prejudice from each category in isolation. It did not consider how the
deficiencies "taken as a whole" would have affected the jury's verdict.
70
There are two things to note about the court's approach. First, the
court's decision is arbitrary. Arbitrary because while there is nothing
illogical about its groupings, there are other, different groupings that are
just as logical and may have produced a different result. For instance, the
failure to interview and prepare the state's witness (4) could have logically
been linked with the failure to prepare other witnessqs (2). And the failure
to conduct a social history investigation (1) is just as much a prerequisite to
preparing witnesses (who must first be identified) (2 and 4) as it is to
retaining a psychologist (3). By drawing these relations, which are as
evident as the court's own, all deficiencies could have been grouped
together and the prejudice determination would, in effect, have cumulated
the errors.
As the case shows, if the focus was on each alleged deficiency in
isolation, a finding of prejudice could become largely dependent on claim
definition and semantics, and thereby fail to measure the overall reliability
of the trial.71  For instance, consider a failure by defense counsel to
69 Banks v. Cockrell, No. 1-40058, 2002 WL 31016679, at *34-35 (5th Cir. Aug. 20,
2002).
70 Id. at *36.
71 On the multiplicity of claim definitions in pleading ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, see, for example, Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle:
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investigate and present multiple mitigating aspects of a defendant's
background in a capital sentencing proceeding. Is this a single error or
many?72  How a defendant pleads and how courts interpret various
performance deficiencies could have a determinative effect on the prejudice
inquiry-if the deficiencies are not cumulated. This demonstrates the
inherent logic in cumulating errors for prejudice, a global reliability inquiry.
The second thing to note is that there is more here than a court's errant
taste in categorizing claims. Recent Supreme Court precedent holds that
defense counsel errors should be cumulated in the Strickland prejudice
prong. In so failing to cumulate, the Fifth Circuit is not alone. The Eighth
Circuit interestingly refuses to cumulate because of Strickland. While most
courts interpret Strickland to advocate cumulation, the Eighth Circuit cites
Strickland as its basis for considering the prejudice of each deficiency
separately.73 This is particularly odd because before Strickland, when the
Circuit applied a Sixth-Amendment-based standard very similar to
Strickland's reasonable-probability prong, it considered counsel's
deficiencies together.74
The Fourth Circuit's approach has also been curiously incorrect. In
Fisher v. Angelone, the defendant, arguing that "the cumulative effect of his
Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99
CoLuM. L. REv. 1103, 1121-22 (1999):
In practical terms, those violations have taken many forms, and the subject matter of ineffective
assistance claims has varied greatly. Broadly speaking, one can raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel both generally and specifically. General claims include allegations that the
lawyer failed to prepare adequately, lacked experience, or neglected to file a claim or discovery
motion. Specific claims, by comparison, include the failure to investigate an issue, to object to
the admissibility or sufficiency of the evidence, to call witnesses, or to cross-examine those
called by the prosecution. The former are substantiated by reference to the record as a whole; the
latter by reference to a specific event or issue.
72 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-97 (2000) (finding that counsel's failures as
a whole undermined the reliability of the verdict).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1994); Girtman v.
Lockhart, 942 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Ryan v. Clarke, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1008,
1079 (D. Neb. 2003) (applying the Stewart/Girtman reasoning post-Wiggins).
74 See Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying cumulative review);
see also Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[E]ven when
combined with Johnson's other assertions [of deficient performance by counsel], [it] falls far
short of meeting the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, however it might be
phrased."). In Girtman, 942 F.2d at 475, the Eighth Circuit stated that it had overruled
Harris in Fink v. Lockhart, 823 F.2d 204, 205-06 (8th Cir. 1987). See Stewart, 20 F.3d at
917-18 (following Girtman). In both Stewart and Girtman, the defendant invoked Harris as
a basis for cumulating prejudice and the Eighth Circuit responded that Strickland changed
the law. See Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996). The court's
decision in Fink, however, did not explicitly discuss cumulative review of defense counsel
errors. See 823 F.2d at 205-06.
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trial counsel's individual actions deprived him of a fair trial," asked the
court to consider the prejudicial effect of each performance deficiency
together in assessing the Strickland prejudice.75  The court refused. It
assessed the prejudice attendant to each deficient performance individually,
then declared, "Having just determined that none of counsel's actions could
be considered constitutional error... it would be odd, to say the least, to
conclude that those same actions, when considered collectively, deprived
Fisher of a fair trial., 76 In treating the defendant's request for "cumulation"
as a request for a cumulative harmless error analysis, the court never gave
the defendant a proper opportunity to establish constitutional error before
declaring there was none.77
This disposition echoes impediments on overall reliability
determination imposed in cumulative harmless error analysis.78 It is an
75 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998). No Fourth Circuit cases have cited Fisher or
followed (or criticized) its reasoning since the Supreme Court's decision in Wiggins (June
26, 2003). This leaves the door open for the Fourth Circuit courts to change their approach
in the future.
76 Id. (citation omitted).
77 The Fourth Circuit and district courts within the circuit present similar reasoning in a
number of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, No. 01-7804, 2002 WL 1011530 (4th
Cir. May 20, 2002); Rocheville v. Moore, No. 98-23, 1999 WL 140668, at *6 n.6 (4th Cir.
Mar. 16, 1999); Roberts v. Curran, No. Civ.A. AMD 96-478, 2002 WL 32330995 (D. Md.
Aug. 21, 2002); Cole v. Saunders, No. Civ.A. 7:01CV00395, 2002 WL 32074707 (W.D. Va.
2002); Hansford v. Angelone, 244 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Va. 2002); Leary v. Garraghty, 155
F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Va. 2001); Prince v. United States, 2001 WL 34085230 (D.S.C. Dec.
05, 2001). For a discussion of one such case, see Mark Peake, Hoots v. Allsbrook: The
Fourth Circuit's Application of the Strickland Test for Determining Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 598, 606 n.61 (1987), which canvassed other
decisions by the Fourth Circuit and district courts within the Fourth Circuit that fail to
cumulate prejudice under Strickland. See also Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1213, 1223 (4th
Cir. 1986) (Ervin, J., dissenting) (criticizing court for failing to cumulate counsel's
performance errors in assessing prejudice under Strickland).
78 In mistakenly distinguishing cases relied on by the defendant as ones in which the
defendant established both prongs of Strickland before considering cumulation, the court
noted that "legitimate cumulative-error analysis evaluates only the effect of matters actually
determined to be constitutional error, not the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions
deemed to deficient." Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852 n.9. This mirrors cumulative harmless error
analysis, which we will discuss in Section IV. It bears mention here that the Fourth Circuit's
statement that its holding was "in agreement with the majority of our sister circuits that have
considered the issue," id. at 852, is incorrect. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits were on
its side, the court said, while the Second and Seventh Circuits were opposed. The Ninth
Circuit's approach to Strickland prejudice, both before and after Fisher, is to cumulate
prejudice. See Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 2002); Turner v. Duncan, 158
F.3d 449, 457 (9th Cir. 1998); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). It refuses to
cumulate only when instances of deficient performance together fail Strickland's second
prong. See United States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit
not only cumulates prejudice within the second prong of Strickland before determining
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instructive precursor to the discussions-of integrating Strickland prejudice
with Bagley materiality, and of integrating all reliability-impacting errors
for prejudice analysis-that follow.
III. WHY BAGLEY MATERIALITY AND STRICKLAND PREJUDICE SHOULD BE
READ TOGETHER
Having dispensed with doubt about cumulating defense counsel errors
in Strickland, we address a second problem. Given the history and character
of the doctrines, one must ask: if Bagley materiality and Strickland
prejudice ask the same fundamental question, shouldn't prosecutorial
suppressions and defense counsel failures-the opening-prong violations of
Bagley and Strickland-be aggregated when determining the reliability of a
verdict? Specifically, shouldn't all defense counsel deficiencies be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances when determining
Bagley materiality; shouldn't all suppressed items of evidence come into
play when defense counsel's presentation to the jury is "taken as a whole"?
The short answer to these questions is yes. To begin, this integration
simply makes sense. The Supreme Court could have embraced other core
values, such as the integrity of the proceedings, but it did not. Reliability of
the verdict, fundamentally a due process notion, is the chosen constitutional
concern of both Bagley and Strickland. Since suppressions and failings of
defense counsel alike impact the reliability of the verdict, logic says to
consider their collective impact in ascertaining if a verdict is reliable. Put
somewhat differently: if the core constitutional value is the reliability of the
verdict, then it should be of no moment whether the verdict is not reliable as
a result of counsel's deficient performance, the prosecutor's withholding of
favorable information, or a combination of the two.
79
whether there is constitutional error, see Humphreys v. Gibson, 261 F.3d 1016, 1021 (10th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1988), but it also allows mere
first-prong violations-discrete instances of deficient performance-in its cumulative
error/harmless error review. See Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir.
1999). The opinion did not mention the Fifth Circuit.
79 To be precise, prejudice and materiality should be considered cumulatively, in our
view, only if the defendant is able to make the initial showing for both categories of error. In
other words, the defendant would first have to satisfy Strickland prong one (counsel acted
unreasonably), and Brady prongs one and two (there was a withholding of favorable
information). If the defendant can make such a showing, a reviewing court would then ask
whether as a result of both trial counsel's inadequate performance and the prosecution's
withholding of favorable information is there a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different.
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A. STRICKLAND PREJUDICE
In Part I, we took the time to develop the history of the Strickland
prejudice and Bagley materiality standards because we believe that the due
process nature of both have always envisioned a scope of review that
endorses integrating defense counsel's failures with prosecution
suppression errors (and others, as we'll discuss in Part IV) in assessing
prejudice. With regard to Strickland, we look back to Powell, in which the
Supreme Court said deprivation of the right to counsel violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.80 It decided this based on
the totality of the circumstances in the case.81 It was not just the trial
court's failure to appoint counsel or the rush to trial. It was also the racist
environment and the defendants' helplessness. Together, all these things
made it very likely that the jury never knew the truth. The characteristics
germane in Powell, fundamental right and concern with totality of the
circumstances, have defined the right to counsel ever since. 2  Gideon
reaffirmed Powell's statement that the right to counsel was fundamental,
even as it defined a new relationship between the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.83 Powell said a fundamental right could coexist in multiple
Amendments. The Gideon majority recognized that a fundamental right
could also travel from one Amendment through another. The Fourteenth
Amendment could thus be a source of the right to counsel, and also a
medium "incorporating" the Sixth Amendment. These roles are not
mutually exclusive. Gideon did not overrule Powell; far from it. The facts
of Gideon only called for the Fourteenth Amendment to serve the role of
medium: because the Court applied a bright-line rule of appointment, it had
go Powell v. California, 287 U.S. 45, 65-69 (1932).
81 See supra Part I.A. 1.
82 One might argue that had the Sixth Amendment applied to the States in 1932, it would
have been the basis for reversal in Powell and that the Court utilized the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Bill of Rights to state defendants who were not,
at that time, granted its protection. There are certainly multiple reasons for the Court's use
of the due process based totality-of-the-circumstances review in Powell, some of which are
definitely historical. But subsequent decisions of the Court show that, even had the Sixth
Amendment then applied to the States, the defendants in Powell would have no less been
denied due process of law. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("The
[Powell] decision did not turn upon the fact that the benefit of counsel would have been
guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth Amendment if they had been
prosecuted in a federal court. The decision turned upon the fact that in the particular
situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance
of a hearing."), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969). Thus, at the end of the day, the Powell Court reached the correct result using the
correct methodology.
83 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).
1175
JOHN H. BLUME & CHRISTOPHER SEEDS
no need to engage in totality-of-the-circumstances review. After Gideon,
the totality of the circumstances in a case could lead to a right to counsel
violation; or the Fourteenth Amendment could deliver, for example, the rule
of absolute appointment created in Johnson v. Zerbst.
84
As lower courts developed standards for effective assistance following
Gideon, they increasingly viewed the Sixth Amendment through the
Fourteenth.85  Yet effectiveness-of-counsel tests (in circumstances where
prejudice is not presumed), unlike Johnson v. Zerbst's appointment rule,
called (in both federal and state court proceedings) for the Fourteenth
Amendment to play the source role-for courts to look at the totality of the
circumstances to see if "reasonably competeit" counsel would have made a
difference. So in the effectiveness context, the Fourteenth Amendment
took on both characteristics, source and medium. This is at the core of the
Supreme Court's decision in Strickland.
Strickland is, principally, a case about fundamental fairness.86 The
Court could have applied, as in Gideon, a bright-line rule regarding
deficient performance. But it did not. It embraced a distinctly due process
fixation, the prejudice prong, to serve a distinctly due process function,
insuring a fair and reliable result.87 Many argued that no true Sixth
Amendment violation would have a built-in prejudice requirement.
Perhaps, but an ineffective assistance of counsel violation, though
commonly referred to as a Sixth Amendment violation, may likewise
violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.88
84 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
85 See supra notes 24, 39.
86 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
87 Id. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Strickland, felt that the majority did not go far
enough in giving voice to the right to counsel's due process roots. Justice Marshall urged
that a showing of deficient performance, in itself, violates due process and warrants a new
trial: "A proceeding in which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in
meeting the forces of the State does not, in my opinion, constitute due process.... I would
thus hold that a showing that the performance of a defendant's lawyer departed from
constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the defendant
suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby." Id. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 For instance, one might argue that had the Sixth Amendment then applied to the states,
it would have been the basis for reversal in Powell, and that the Court utilized the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Bill of Rights to state defendants
who were not, at that time, granted its protection. This argument would derive from Gideon,
372 U.S. at 341-45 (interpreting Powell). But even had the Sixth Amendment applied, the
defendants would have no less been denied due process of law. See, e.g., Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("The [Powell] decision did not turn upon the fact
that the benefit of counsel would have been guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions
of the Sixth Amendment if they had been prosecuted in a federal court. The decision turned
upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of
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The prejudice requirement is, therefore, more than a "vestige" of due
process.8 9 Strickland's totality-of-the-circumstances focus refers back to
Powell-to Fourteenth Amendment roots of the right that remain just as
legitimate today.
That leads to this point: if Strickland's totality-of-the-circumstances
focus in the prejudice prong refers back to Powell, then it is from Powell
that we should define the scope of circumstances considered for Strickland
prejudice.
Powell took into account numerous factors about the trial: not just
defense counsel's failure to perform, but circumstances ranging from the
racist mob to the defendants' lack of education. Applying the same scope
to Strickland to ask if counsel's failures undermined confidence in the
verdict, we need to do more than take into account the ways in which
counsel performed unreasonably-that is the deficiency prong. We also
need to know whether it mattered. To properly calibrate the effect of these
errors on the outcome, we must also account for the characteristics of the
defendants, the circumstances of the trial, the evidence presented (and
excluded), the instructions provided to the jury at trial and, at least
potentially, a myriad of other factors. For example, do the defendants have
mental impairments that would have supported a challenge to the
voluntariness of a confession that counsel failed to uncover? Were bigoted
threats involved that defense counsel knew about but failed to bring to the
court's attention? Was there a witness to the crime that defense counsel
failed to interview whose testimony would have exculpated the defendants,
which we now know about only through belated disclosure? Was there
impeachment information that would have discredited an important
witness? All of these-including the last two, which incorporate the Brady
doctrine's first prongs-are relevant to the totality of the circumstances as
Powell understood them. They are just as relevant to Strickland prejudice.
And, most importantly, they are crucial to an accurate reliability
assessment.
The Court's recent interpretation of Strickland in Wiggins v. Smith,90
which involved multiple failures of defense counsel related to the penalty
phase, is consistent with this interpretation. Explaining that available
evidence should be "taken as a whole," Wiggins noted that "[i]n assessing
prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of
counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing."), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
89 Cf Green, supra note 29, at 1060 (arguing that the prejudice requirement is a "vestige
of due process").
9' 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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available mitigating evidence." 91 The Court measured "available mitigating
evidence" at the time of appellate review, looking at all evidence that
reasonably competent counsel could have presented in light of the post-
conviction proceedings.92 This included the "mitigating evidence counsel
failed to discover and present in th[e] [trial] case., 93 Wiggins's promise to
weigh the "totality of available mitigating evidence," read in light of
Powell, might also include any mitigating evidence withheld by the
prosecution that reasonably competent counsel would have used.94
B. BAGLEY MATERIALITY
In the opening part of this section, we referred to the common-sense
appeal of cumulating suppression errors within the Strickland prejudice
determination. From a perspective that seeks truth, as the adversarial
process does, this makes sense. No fact-finder can reliably measure the
impact of defense counsel's failures without measuring the impact of the
prosecution's failure to provide relevant information. The totality-of-
circumstances measure of fundamental fairness applied in Powell is equally
inherent and indispensable to Brady due process violations. Similar to
Strickland prejudice, Bagley materiality takes into account not only the
prosecution's indiscretions but also the rest of the trial, including defense
counsel's performance. The Supreme Court stressed in Bagley that the
materiality inquiry concerns not only what the jury heard, but also how
defense counsel's preparation and strategy would have been altered. If, for
example, defense counsel's superior performance renders suppression a
moot point, then there will be no reversal.95 Materiality thus depends on an
evaluation of defense counsel's deficient performance.
9' 1d. at 534, 538.
92 Id. at 534.
93 id.
94 For a discussion of the impact of Wiggins v. Smith on ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrine, see Lyn Entzeroth, Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences, Where Are We
Now?: A Review of Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 39 TULSA L. REv. 49
(2003); Robin M. Maher, 'The Guiding Hand of Counsel' and the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1091 (2003).
95 For example, suppose the prosecution possesses an inconsistent statement of one of its
witnesses, yet neglects to provide it to defense counsel. If in cross-examining the witness
defense counsel then, through superior performance or serendipity, unearths the
inconsistency, it no longer matters so far as reliability of verdict is concerned that the
prosecution suppressed the inconsistent statement. Defense counsel has found the
information, and provided it to the jury, on its own.
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The interplay is most acute when the breakdowns on both sides
concern the same information or witness.96 In that event, the materiality
inquiry fully includes Strickland. Consider a situation in which defense
counsel was allegedly ineffective for failing to interview a witness whose
statement the prosecution suppressed and who should have been
interviewed despite the suppression. The Strickland query asks what
reasonably competent counsel would have achieved by interviewing and
presenting the witness's testimony; the materiality inquiry is what
reasonably competent counsel would have done with the witness's
statements. Both ask what competent counsel would have done with
information the witness provided.
This interplay was at work in Kyles v. Whitley, in which the
government suppressed statements by several witnesses (two of which were
eyewitnesses) that defense counsel also failed to interview.97 Kyles
challenged the suppression of those statements and also alleged that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to interview the witnesses and for failing
to call one witness to testify.98 Each of the alleged deficiencies thus related
to witnesses whose statements were suppressed.
A majority of the Fifth Circuit considered the materiality of each of the
suppressed statements of information separately. 99  It also reviewed,
independently, the impact of each of the claimed deficiencies in defense
counsel's performance.100 The court held that none of the parties' mistakes
unhinged the reliability of the trial. 1 1 Yet the impact of defense counsel's
failure to interview the witnesses was strikingly evident only once the
suppressed statements were disclosed: not only did the statements impeach
the witnesses, but they also directly supported the defense's theory-that
one of the witnesses was the murderer and was framing Kyles.
96 For instance, when a court recognizes how significant a failure to interview a witness
was based on the disclosure of previously suppressed witness testimony or statements, it
accounts for Bagley suppression in the Strickland prejudice determination. When a court
recognizes that a piece of suppressed evidence would have significantly altered the defense
strategy, it accounts for defense counsel's performance in the Bagley materiality
determination. See discussion of Kyles, supra Part 1.B.2.
" 5 F.3d 806, 811-17 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
98 Id. at 811, 818.
99 Id. at 811-17; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441 (1995) ("The result
reached by the Fifth Circuit majority is compatible with a series of independent materiality
evaluations, rather than the cumulative evaluation required by Bagley .. "). But see id. at
459 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is clear beyond cavil that the court assessed the cumulative
effect of the Brady evidence in the context of the whole record.").
'oo Kyles, 5 F.3d at 818-20.
"' Id. at 811-20.
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The dissenting Fifth Circuit judge focused on this interplay between
the statements and counsel's failures. "[C]hiefly concern[ed with] how a
reasonably effective trial counsel would have used the Brady evidence had
it been properly disclosed by the State,"'102 Judge King recognized that there
was really but a single question before the court:
I believe that the only appropriate way to analyze Kyles' case is to consider his
ineffectiveness and Brady claims in conjunction. After all, the "materiality" prong of
his Brady claim in a significant way directly relates to the "prejudice" prong of his
ineffectiveness claim, and vice versa. Furthermore,... the inquiry for both claims is
identical: assuming, counter-factually, that Wallace had in fact been called as a
defense witness and that trial counsel had been privy to all of the aforementioned
Brady evidence, it must be asked whether there is a "reasonable probability" that the
result of the guilt/innocence phase or punishment phase would have been different.
10 3
After separately assessing the opening prongs of Strickland and
Brady,' 4 Judge King restated the query in terms of both tests:
[W]hether there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for the two constitutional errors
working in conjunction, Kyles' jury, considering all the relevant evidence, would not
have unanimously found either that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Kyles was guilty or that Kyles should receive a death
sentence. 105
"The heart of the inquiry here," she emphasized, "is whether the
constitutional infirmities rendered the proceeding unreliable."
10 6
When the Kyles case reached the Supreme Court, the Court identified
the same symbiosis as Judge King's dissent. Although the Court granted
certiorari on the Brady issue alone, and therefore did not adjudicate
ineffective assistance of counsel, it addressed the same deficiencies in
defense counsel's performance that Kyles raised below (failure to interview
three witnesses and failure to call one as a witness) because what competent
counsel would have done with the suppressed information was integral to
materiality. With the information in the statements of the two eyewitnesses,
the Court noted, reasonably competent counsel would have destroyed the
value of those witnesses on cross-examination. 10 7 With the information in
102 Id. at 832 (King, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 831 (King, J., dissenting); see also id. at 827 ("[B]ecause the critical issue of
'materiality' in this court's Brady analysis is governed by a standard identical to that
governing the 'prejudice' prong of the two-prong ineffectiveness analysis required by
Strickland, I will address the Brady 'materiality' and Strickland 'prejudice' issues together
after separately analyzing the first prongs of the Strickland and Brady standards.").
104 See id. at 827 (King, J., dissenting).
'0' Id. at 832 (King, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (King, J., dissenting).
107 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 419, 442-45 (1995).
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the other witness's (Wallace's) statements, competent counsel could have
"attack[ed] not only the probative value of crucial physical evidence and the
circumstances in which it was found, but the thoroughness and even the
good faith of the investigation, as well."'' 0 8 Finally, reasonably competent
counsel could have called Wallace as an adverse witness without
concern. 109 The Court did not explicitly fuse Brady and Strickland. But the
Court's approach to materiality was very similar to that taken in the
dissenting Fifth Circuit opinion. And the Court reached the same
conclusion: disclosed to "competent counsel," the information the witnesses
provided "would have made a different result reasonably probable.' ' 1°
In a case like Kyles, however, where defense counsel's failures relate
to witnesses whose statements are suppressed, the materiality and
Strickland prejudice inquiries are, as the dissenting Fifth Circuit Judge
observed, identical."' But in any case, the scope of circumstances relevant
to the materiality inquiry matches that of Strickland prejudice, and thus
includes defense counsel's errors. Consider, for instance, the following
hypothetical case: A defendant is convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death for shooting and killing a bystander during a convenience-store
robbery, in which the defendant was one of several participants. Following
the conviction and sentence, further investigation reveals that defense
counsel failed to interview witnesses that would have provided information
and would have been willing to testify about adverse circumstances in the
defendant's childhood home. Suppose post-conviction investigation also
reveals that the prosecution possessed a statement by a witness who said the
defendant was coerced into participating in the robbery, and that this
statement-which mitigates against a death sentence, although it may have
done little to help the defendant avoid a conviction-was never provided to
defense counsel. In sum, with respect to sentencing, the post-conviction
investigation has established Strickland's first prong as well as the
suppression and materiality requirements of Brady.
Unlike Kyles, however, defense counsel's errors and the suppression
error in this hypothetical case are factually unrelated. Yet both parties'
108 Id. at 445.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 441.
m Such equivalence between Strickland prejudice and Bagley materiality is not limited
to situations in which defense counsel fails to interview a witness with respect to which the
state has suppressed Brady material. The inquiries are the same whenever the errors, as in
Kyles, are factually related. Say, for example, in a case of a gun going off during a struggle,
where the State suppresses its ballistics expert's report finding the gun had a hair trigger and
defense counsel meanwhile fails to make a funding motion for a ballistics expert, thus
preventing impeachment of the State expert.
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errors deprived the jury of information relevant to deciding whether to
impose the death penalty-information that the jury, in the process of
making its sentencing decision, would have considered simultaneously. As
such, the jurors need not have been persuaded by any piece of evidence
alone: knowing that the defendant was coerced into participating in the
robbery, in combination with knowing about the adversity the defendant
faced growing up, in combination with whatever other mitigating factors
were presented at the original sentencing trial, may have swayed at least
one juror to vote for a life sentence. Given this context, if a court believes
that multiple errors undermine confidence in a verdict, should it uphold the
verdict as reliable simply because it believes that each of the errors in
isolation did not sabotage the verdict's integrity? No, demanding that any
one of the pieces of missing information had to, in and of itself, change a
juror's mind defies reason-particularly in jurisdictions where jurors
exercise discretion to impose a life sentence for any reason or no reason at
all; in effect, such a demand pretends that the errors responsible for
depriving the jury of information occurred in different cases. And beyond
defying reason, this misguided approach would ignore the due process,
totality-of-the-circumstances roots of the Brady and Strickland doctrines
that we featured in Part I.
Consequently, an appellate court reviewing the reliability of the jury's
sentencing decision in a case like the hypothetical should look at the impact
of defense counsel's errors and the impact of the prosecution's suppression
error in combination-it should consider all the ways in which the cases
presented by both parties would have been different, in their entirety, but
for the parties' errors-then assess whether the sentencing decision would
have been different.1 12  Whether a case involves interlocking defense-
counsel and prosecution errors, like Kyles, or factually distinct errors, as in
112 A recent example of this in an actual case is Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). In
Banks, a majority of the Supreme Court, in determining Brady materiality, took into account
facts that were omitted from trial as a result of defense counsel's failure. The majority thus
considered, alongside damaging trial testimony showing that Banks threatened and pistol-
whipped his brother-in-law, the fact-which defense counsel failed to uncover-that the
brother-in-law, not Banks, instigated the fight. Id. at 699 n.17. Neither of these facts carried
great weight in the majority's finding of materiality, see id. at 698-703, but the point stressed
here is that they were considered cumulatively. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia in
dissent in Banks, did not take issue with cumulating prosecutorial suppression and defense
counsel failures for determining Brady materiality. Finding materiality a "very close
question," id. at 706 (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice Thomas concluded that "even if it is
appropriate to mix-and-match the prejudice analysis of the Brady claim and the claim under
Strickland (rather than to evaluate them independently, as distinct potential constitutional
violations), Banks' response was vastly disproportional to his brother-in-law's actions." Id.
at 708.
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the hypothetical, the same rule should apply: cumulate the prejudice from
the errors, then determine the reliability of the verdict.1 13 In either event,
Judge King's dissent in Kyles exemplifies how to measure the combined
impact of Brady and Strickland errors: fuse the materiality and prejudice
questions and answer both simultaneously. If there is a reasonable
probability that, but for both parties' missteps, the outcome would have
been different, violations of both Brady and Strickland result.
C. WHY COURTS DON'T CUMULATE: A NOTE ON CATEGORIES
If at this point of the discussion, the necessity of integrating materiality
and prejudice seems obvious, one may well wonder why courts do not
already do it. Much of the reason is that the Supreme Court has never
firmly embraced the idea of cumulative error, to which we turn in Part IV,
and thus there is no clear doctrinal "hook." Perhaps consequentially,
attorneys have not aggressively pursued cumulating Bagley materiality,
Strickland prejudice, and other reliability-impacting errors as a litigation
strategy. Along the same lines, courts accustomed to considering the errors
separately have not set out to change their practice. Courts continue to
perceive the division between prosecutorial-suppression errors and
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel errors-the former a Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation and the latter now viewed predominantly
under the Sixth Amendment-as rendering the errors apples and oranges,
effectively incomparable in terms of their effect on the trial. Or courts rely
113 See, e.g., Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1078 (10th Cir. 2001), vacated in
part, 279 F.3d 922, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). After finding that defense counsel's
failure to object to a confession letter fell below an objective standard of reasonable
performance and that the State's failure to disclose a negative semen test deprived the
defendant of favorable evidence, the court fused the prejudice inquiry, finding "both
[Strickland and Brady] tests were established to preserve the integrity of the trial process and
they adopt similar standards to reach this goal." Id. The court concluded that there was "no
basis in law for affirming a trial outcome that would likely have changed in light of a
combination of Strickland and Brady errors." Id. Yet another example is the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gunsby:
The second prong of Strickland poses the more difficult question of whether counsel's deficient
performance, standing alone, deprived Gunsby of a fair trial. Nevertheless, when we consider
the cumulative effect of the testimony presented at the [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel]
hearing and the admitted Brady violations on the part of the State, we are compelled to find,
under the unique circumstances of this case, that confidence in the outcome of Gunsby's original
trial has been undermined and that a reasonable probability exists of a different outcome.
670 So. 2d 920, 924 (Fla. 1996) (cross-referencing Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.
1995), which held that the cumulative effect of defense-counsel deficiencies was
prejudicial). The opinion suggests that the Florida Supreme Court viewed combining as a
unique due process violation. What we stress here is that the combined prejudice from the
prosecution and defense counsel performance in fact violated both.
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dogmatically on the tiered structure of Brady and Strickland errors (no
constitutional error arises unless both performance defect and prejudice are
shown) to dispose of claims, calculating that nothing (1/2 of Strickland) +
nothing (3/4 of Brady) = nothing.
Such formalistic approaches adhere to categorizations of Brady and
Strickland errors. As Amsterdam and Bruner describe in their book
Minding the Law, all "things may take the shape of rules and principles,
rights and obligations, freedoms and commitments, values and goals," and
even legal doctrines such as Brady, Strickland, or harmless error inevitably
carry with them some preconceived notions about their character. Things
come tinged by labels and predefinition. In a general sense, things come
categorized according to a value system "grounded in what our culture
designates as mattering." In the law, rules, principles, and doctrines are the
product of reasoning that itself depends "upon notions about the nature of
things generally, what they are and how they are related." In short, we
categorize things to serve a purpose. As Amsterdam and Bruner describe,
categories are themselves "meaning making," they "serve particular
functions." Over time, categories become "entrenched" as habit and often
they cover up truths. 1 4  These formalistic approaches adhere to certain
categorizations of Brady and Strickland errors (as errors that are not
constitutional errors unless prejudice is found, as due process violations vs.
Sixth Amendment violations) in a manner that is inconsistent with the
doctrines' roots and purpose, divides reliability determinations, and thus
undercuts the core aspiration-one might say, the truth--of both doctrines,
to ensure reliable verdicts.
Formalistic application also sabotages cumulative harmless error
analysis, a due process doctrine that could accomplish the global reliability
check we seek.
IV. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS
If the Circuit Court dissent in Kyles provides a model of how to
measure the combined impact of Brady and Strickland errors, it also begs
114 Amsterdam's and Bruner's conception of categories as ever-changing in response to
the wants and needs of society finds common voice in philosophical conceptions of power
(from Nietzsche to Foucault to Derrida and so on) and in critical legal and social theory.
See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 195, 200 (1987) (recognizing that "the commonplace legal discourses often
produce such seriously distorted representations of social life that their categories regularly
filter out complexity, variety, irrationality, unpredictability, disorder... [and] exclude or
repress alternative visions of social life."); see also J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and
Legal Theory, 96 YALE L. J. 743, 763 (1987) (discussing the "privileging of particular legal
ideas").
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the question, why stop there? Other errors affect the reliability of the
verdict, so shouldn't the prejudice catalyzed by those errors be considered
along with Bagley and Strickland? Otherwise, aren't we left at a similar
place, with reliability divided, lacking a universal account of what happened
at the trial from the jurors' perspective? Why shouldn't courts, then,
consider all errors that affect the jury's consideration of the facts in tandem?
At first glance, an apparent mechanism for this already exists: the due-
process doctrine known as cumulative harmless error. But in practice,
cumulative harmless error analysis does not fare well in achieving a
comprehensive determination of a verdict's reliability.
The reasons for this begin with the lack of strong doctrinal
underpinning. When one sets out to investigate the origins of cumulative
harmless error, there is not a lot to find. The Supreme Court first
mentioned the concept in a footnote to Taylor v. Kentucky, accepting the
idea that several errors that do not individually amount to reversible error
may cumulatively deny a defendant the right to a fair trial." 5 But apart
from this widely recognized genesis, there is no cumulative harmless error
"doctrine" per se.116
Consequently, differing approaches to cumulating harmless errors
have arisen. 17 They rely on a combination of Taylor and other Supreme
115 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978) (concluding that "the cumulative effect of the
potentially damaging circumstances of this case violated the due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness").
116 See, e.g., Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court
has not held that distinct constitutional claims can be cumulated to grant habeas relief."),
amended on other grounds by 307 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2002).
117 All of the federal circuits consider the effect of cumulative errors on direct review.
See United States v. Ollivierre, 378 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 125
S. Ct. 1064 (2005); United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2004); Marshall v.
Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
1999); United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 418 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rogers,
89 F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1100 (1lth Cir.
1996); Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
1161 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones, 482 F.2d 747 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Except for the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, the federal courts of appeals
apply cumulative error analysis, without explicit distinction from the direct-appeal context,
in the review of habeas corpus petitions. See Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir.
2004); Mello v. DiPaulo, 295 F.3d 137 (1st Cir. 2002); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117
(9th Cir. 2002); Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36 (3d Cir. 2002); Alvarez v. Boyd, 225
F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999); Fisher v.
Angelone, 163 F.3d 835 (4th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994).
While the Fifth Circuit does consider cumulative error claims in habeas corpus petitions, it
has limited the type of errors that may be considered. See Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also infra note 120-23 and accompanying text; Rachel A. Van
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Court authority establishing the right to due process. 1 8 Yet the approaches
differ with respect to the errors included, the standard of review, and the
rules of procedure and preservation that govern the scope of review:
[G]eneral agreement masks the subtle and protracted problems that arise whenever a
court undertakes a cumulative error analysis. Which errors should be included in the
cumulative mix? And what standard, other than "I know it when I see it," governs the
due process inquiry in cumulative error cases? Most courts deny relief on claims of
cumulative error with little or no discussion and, thus, avoid these questions
altogether. Yet, the questions remain.
119
Stated another way, certain courts limit the review more than others.
The significance of these limitations extends beyond their diversity,
which itself may promote arbitrary application of due process. According
to Taylor, the purpose of the cumulative harmless error inquiry is to insure
a fundamentally fair and reliable verdict. Reliability is the core value. As
such, cumulative harmless error analysis, like any inquiry into the reliability
of a verdict (Bagley materiality or Strickland prejudice, for instance),
demands a global scope of review. The more inclusive cumulative
harmless error analysis is, the more effective it will be in measuring verdict
reliability. A less worthy consideration of a verdict's reliability results if
the analysis is segregated-if reliability-impacting errors are considered
individually or partially.
From this perspective, any limitation on the errors a court considers
threatens to jeopardize the analysis because it divides the reliability inquiry.
Consider, for instance, limits the Fifth Circuit imposes. The court accepts
an error for cumulative harmless error analysis only if it is "of
constitutional dimension," unaccompanied by a curative instruction, and
properly preserved and not procedurally defaulted. 120  In applying the
Cleave, When is an Error Not an "Error"? Habeas Corpus and Cumulative Error Analysis,
46 BAYLOR L. REv. 59, 62 (1993). The Sixth Circuit has held that cumulative error is not a
basis for granting habeas relief in non-capital cases. See Davis v. Burt, 100 F. App'x 340,
351 (6th Cir. 2004); Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 447. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
rejected the cumulative error analysis in the context of habeas corpus. Wainwright v.
Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996); Lee v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1985).
See generally Van Cleave, supra, at 63.
118 See, e.g., Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1018 (10th Cir. 2003). The court
determined that cumulative harmless error analysis "is an extension of harmless error, and
conducts the same inquiry as for individual error, focusing on the underlying fairness of the
trial. The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to
prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error." Id. (quotations and
citations omitted); see also United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
119 Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 374 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
120 Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 621 (5th Cir. 1991).
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"constitutional dimension" requirement, the court views mere instances of
deficient performance by counsel or prosecutorial suppression, absent
prejudice, as "adverse events" not available for cumulative error review. 121
Similarly, if a trial error that impacts reliability is followed by a curative
instruction, the court will not include it, because "if the trial court cured a
putative error, the petitioner is complaining only of an adverse event rather
than actual error." 122 And if prior counsel previously failed to challenge
any errors impacting the evidence the jury heard or did not hear, that claim
is waived. 123 Each of these requirements has the effect of circumscribing
removing reliability-impacting errors from inclusion in the cumulative
review.
121 Id. The Fifth Circuit's reversal of the District Court in the recent case of Banks
exemplifies the court's approach. Banks v. Cockrell, No. 01-40058 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2002)
(per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
opinions/unpub/01/01-40058.0.wpd.pdf. Banks claimed ineffective assistance of counsel
and a Brady violation based on one witness's undisclosed paid-informant status in his third
state petition. See id. at 8. Recommending relief as to the death sentence, the District Court,
adopting the magistrate's opinion, integrated Strickland and Brady violations. Banks v.
Johnson, No. 5:96-CV-353, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2000) (unpublished)
(concurring with Banks v. Johnson, No. 5:96-CV-353 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2000)
(unpublished magistrate decision)). For prejudice on each claim, the District Court looked at
the impact of the withholding of the informant status together with counsel's mistakes. See
Banks, No. 01-40058, slip op. at 34-35. It fused the Brady and Strickland violations: in the
Brady context, materiality factored in defense counsel's mistakes; in the Strickland context,
prejudice included the State's failure to disclose. In light of Powell and due process
precedent, the court properly looked at the totality of the circumstances and found a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly invoked
cumulative error doctrine. It viewed the fusion ("each holding included the other as the basis
of materiality or prejudice") of "unrelated" Brady and Strickland claims as a cumulative
error exercise. 1d. at 45-46; see id at 44 ("[T]he magistrate judge seems to have grounded
her recommendations with respect to both claims on cumulative error."). As a novel claim,
it needed to be exhausted in state court before raised in federal habeas. Because Banks had
relied only on Brady and Strickland claims in his prior federal and state petitions, the court
dismissed the claim. Id. at 46-47.
Furthermore, the Court held, there was no basis for cumulation because there were no
actual violations of all prongs of Brady or Strickland. "For there to be cumulative error", the
court reflected, "there must first be error." Id. at 47. Another recent example is Hooks v.
Dretke, 93 F. App'x 665 (5th Cir. 2004), in which the court refused to cumulate deficient-
performance-of-counsel errors with Ake errors because counsel's failings didn't amount to
constitutional (prejudicial) error under Strickland.
122 Derden, 938 F.2d at 621.
123 For a critique of the Fifth Circuit's test for evaluating due process violations based on
cumulative error, see Van Cleave, supra note 117, at 72-88; Jack Kenneth Dahlberg, Jr.,
Analysis of Cumulative Error in the Harmless Error Doctrine: A Case Study, 12 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 561 (1981).
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So why the limitations? The answer is that in defining the scope of
cumulative harmless error analysis, courts are focusing less on verdict
reliability than on two other, also legitimate, concerns-first, that
fundamental fairness determinations could overrun other rules of criminal
procedure and, second, that the same could displace state interests in
finality in favor of federal review:
"Cumulative error" is an infinitely expandable concept that, allowed to run amok,
could easily swallow the jurisprudence construing the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights and determining minimum standards of procedural due process.... The
legal certainty afforded by rules drawn from the specific Bill of Rights provisions
related to criminal law could then yield to the subjectivity of fundamental fairness
determinations.... Equally important, granting habeas relief from state convictions
for aggregated non-constitutional errors may too easily conflict with established limits
on the scope of federal habeas relief. The result would thwart recent decisions that
emphasize due regard of the finality of state court judgments. 12
4
The question is: can these legitimate reasons for limiting collateral
litigation reconcile with the need to assess verdict reliability globally, not
piecemeal?
A. RECONCILING LIMITS ON COLLATERAL LITIGATION WITH
GLOBAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
Let's start with a point of clarification: Both finality of state verdicts
and protection of other criminal procedure jurisprudence are, in some
circumstances, legitimate reasons for limiting subsequent review. But that
does not mean that any limitation placed on cumulative harmless error
analysis in their name is valid. To reconcile these interests with the core
value of reliability one must distinguish points of unavoidable conflict from
matters that can be resolved; then accept the former and dismiss the latter.
The only point of truly unavoidable conflict is the enforcement of
preservation and procedural default doctrines to protect finality interests.
Federal courts' approach to such unpreserved or "waived" claims has been
to exclude them from cumulative harmless error review. Not because they
are not relevant or part of the relevant circumstances of the trial, but
because the defendant/petitioner may, under some circumstances, forfeit the
right to have that aspect of the proceeding considered by his own actions-
for instance, by failing to raise the claim in state court. But the fact that an
error impacting reliability wasn't raised on direct appeal or state collateral
appeal does not dissolve its reliability-impacting character: although
interests in finality weigh against its tardy adjudication, its real-world
124 Pursell, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (quoting Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1457-58
(5th Cir. 1992)).
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impact on the reliability of the verdict remains. So to respect the interest in
finality, the reliability impact of some errors may not be considered. The
rationale is that the petitioner has forsaken the claim through his own lack
of diligence.
There are, on the other hand, current limitations that do not serve a
legitimate purpose. Take for example, the Fifth Circuit's application of its
"constitutional dimension" requirement, which purportedly exists to prevent
cumulative harmless error analysis from intruding on other doctrines of
criminal law. By the court's terms, it will join Brady and Strickland errors
with other errors in cumulative harmless error analysis, but only ifprejudice
or materiality are found. It thus excludes failed instances of deficient
performance by defense counsel or prosecutorial suppression-which may
affect reliability, albeit at a level less than a "reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different" from cumulative harmless error
review. But cumulative harmless error analysis, occurring as it does after
individual claims of error have failed, serves to review failed errors. Far
from protecting the integrity of Brady doctrine or Strickland doctrine, the
court's tautology serves only to obstruct the purpose of the cumulative
harmless error analysis, which is to review the aggregate impact of all
individually harmless errors on the reliability of the verdict. 
125
In limiting cumulative harmless error review, a court need not dispense
with errors, such as deficient performance by defense counsel or
suppression by the prosecution, that have failed to meet the applicable
substantive prejudice standard simply because those doctrines incorporate
prejudice in the definition of the error. Types of error denied for
insufficient prejudice that incorporate their own prejudice components
should be included in the cumulative analysis. As one court has noted:
[P]articular types of error... are governed in the first instance by substantive
standards which already incorporate an assessment of prejudice with respect to the
trial process as a whole .... These substantive prejudice components essentially
duplicate the function of harmless-error review. Thus, such claims should be included
in the cumulative-error calculus if they have been individually denied for insufficient
prejudice. Indeed, to deny cumulative-error consideration of claims unless they have
first satisfied their individual substantive standards for actionable prejudice would
125 The same is true of the Fifth Circuit's decision to exclude trial errors followed by a
curative instruction. While a curative instruction may render a record-based error harmless,
it does not absolve the "event" of its reliability-impacting character. The effect of a curative
instruction is to make an error fall short of the applicable harmless-error prejudice standard.
Although the Fifth Circuit dubs this an "adverse event," it is in fact a failed claim of error
which should be part of cumulative harmless error analysis.
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render the cumulative error inquiry meaningless, since it would be predicated only
upon individual error already requiring reversal.
12 6
While the Fifth Circuit focuses on the unique built-in prejudice
component of the Strickland and Bagley standards to the point of
overlooking the purpose of cumulative harmless error review (to review
failed errors), the Tenth Circuit's analysis is problematic for another reason:
it reviews constitutional errors by a standard more lenient than that
applicable to some underlying substantive claims. Specifically, the court
measures errors of constitutional dimension, including failed Bagley and
Strickland claims, for cumulative harmless error by the harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman.127  Whether or not there is a
marked difference in practice between the application of the Chapman
standard (or the Brecht standard) and the "reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different" standard, 128 this discrepancy, at the
very least, presents a potential point of disagreement over the proper
standard. Potential disagreement could be resolved by applying a standard
of review that equates with the strictest of the applicable substantive
standards.
126 Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The
Tenth Circuit recently made the same point in another recent case:
As we have noted, Mr. Darks argued on direct appeal that the accumulation of error
denied him his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. The OCCA
rejected this argument, holding that "if individual assertions of error are rejected, then
the proposition when considered collectively will not yield a different result." The
OCCA's rationale, however, "taken on its face, would render the cumulative error
inquiry meaningless, since it indicates that cumulative error may be predicated only
upon individual error already requiring reversal."
Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 2003). As the Supreme Court explained
in Kyles v. Whitley, "once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error
there is no need for harmless-error review." 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); see United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). Given that Strickland bears the same construction and is
the source of the Bagley standard, the same principle applies.
127 See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
128 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing the Chapman, Brecht, Agurs, and Strickland standards as "ineffable
gradations of probability... beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp");
see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 ("[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration
by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted
ultimately in the defendant's acquittal .... Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a
'reasonable probability' of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is
not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with
the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting
in a verdict worthy of confidence.").
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Reconciling interests in reliability with competing interests in doctrinal
coherence, therefore, must involve: (1) eliminating false limitations on the
review, such as the Fifth Circuit's exclusion of opening-prong Brady and
Strickland errors, to include a broad scope of harmless errors; (2) applying a
standard of review and burden of proof that equates with the strictest of the
substantive standards applicable to the included claims; and (3) enforcing of
preservation and procedural default doctrines to protect finality interests
B. A PROPOSED APPROACH
In general, a cumulative harmless error analysis, to effectuate the core
value of promoting reliable verdicts, should include any and all errors that
affect reliability-whether record-based errors (evidentiary rulings,
instructional errors, Ake errors) or non-record-based errors (such as
Strickland and Brady errors). And it should assess the prejudice coming
from those errors in the context of the circumstances of the trial. Finality
interests may limit the claims of error available for review. But rules such
as the Fifth Circuit applies to exclude opening-prong Strickland or Brady
violations need not. So long as the analysis applies a strict standard of
review and reviews only constitutional errors previously assessed according
to the applicable prejudice standard, cumulative harmless error can be
globally inclusive, and uniform across jurisdictiofis, without consuming
other constitutional law rights such as the Brady and Strickland doctrines
and the associated standards of review in the process.
In the pool of qualifying errors, we would include constitutional errors
found harmless under Chapman and Brecht, or their functional equivalents.
We would include Strickland prong one and Brady prong one and two
errors because they are the functional equivalents of constitutional
violations and they raise integrity concerns where defense counsel or
district attorney violate their most basic obligations. And we would include
defaulted constitutional claims where "cause" 129 is shown (but not
prejudice) because it is an error of constitutional dimension and the
showing of cause, which essentially excuses the default by establishing
there was some impediment to the defendant's ability to properly preserve
the issue, overcomes the state interest in finality. But if no cause is shown,
the interests in finality win out, and claim should be excluded from the
cumulative error review. Together, these form a coherent set of issues
129 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
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relevant to a cumulative harmless error analysis that attempts to promote
reliability but respects finality.130
The analysis itself would proceed as follows. First, a court would
begin by looking at all claims of constitutional error and determining
whether any of those individual errors warrants a new trial (or sentencing
proceeding in a capital case). In doing so, the court would utilize the
current prejudice standard relevant to that claim, i.e., a reasonable
probability the result would have been different but for the error for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and/or Brady claims; the Chapman
standard for non-structural constitutional errors at trial; the Brecht standard
for claims reviewed in federal habeas corpus. Assuming no discrete error
(or errors) mandated a new trial, the court would then conduct, if requested
by the defendant, cumulative error review. 131  Our proposed standard,
commensurate with the strictest of the included claims, would require the
defendant to show that the errors, cumulatively, present a reasonable
probability of a different outcome.132 This approach has a solid doctrinal
130 Countless combinations could result. See Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1207 (providing as
examples: prosecutorial misconduct and improper limitation on defense cross-examination,
improper denial of mid-trial acquittal motion and evidentiary error, Brady error and
prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary errors).
131 To be cognizable for review in federal habeas corpus, the cumulative error claim
would need to be exhausted in state court. Compare id at 1206 (petitioner exhausted
cumulative error claim including deficient performance of counsel, prosecutorial
misconduct, and admission of victim impact testimony, by asserting it on direct appeal in
state post-conviction proceedings), with Gonzales v. McKune, 279 F.3d 922, 925 (10th Cir.
2002) (rejecting request to cumulate Brady materiality and Strickland prejudice because
defendant had not exhausted the issue in state court). Federal courts may only consider
claims from state-court cases if those claims were properly raised in the state court. Known
as the independent-and-adequate-state ground doctrine, this requires federal courts to defer
to a State's clear application of a state trial or appellate procedural rule. A defendant's
failure to properly raise a claim in state court, for instance by failing to object
contemporaneously at trial or raise the claim in state appeals, accordingly, renders the claim
unpreserved, i.e., a procedural default. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz,
Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. C-I. L. REv.
679 (1990); Anne M. Voight, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1111-13
(1999). See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1133-1240 (4th ed. Supp. 2003); John H. Blume & David P.
Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV.
271, 286-90 (1996). Regarding enforcement of exhaustion and procedural default rules, see,
for example, Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique
of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part One), 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327 (1995).
132 The standard of review currently applied to cumulative harmless error analysis varies
by jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit applies two different standards of review, depending on
whether the cumulated errors are constitutional or non-constitutional in nature. If the
cumulated errors are non-constitutional in nature, substantial rights are affected and there is
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basis, linked to the basic due process roots of Strickland and Brady, and it
furthers the Court's constitutional value of choice, "reliability," by
including a broad range of errors. At the same time, to respect finality
interests, it is also narrower than some applications. It is narrowed by the
recognition that you can't throw in the kitchen sink. Rather, an error must
be constitutional error (previously deemed harmless), defaulted
constitutional error for which the petitioner can show "cause," or the
functional equivalent of constitutional error where the prejudice/harmless
error standard is built into the violation. The proposed approach expands
the scope of what is relevant in making the reliability determination and it
provides a sensible and defensible understanding of the limits of cumulative
harmless error review. 
133
reversible error if the cumulated errors have a substantial influence on the outcome of the
trial or leave one in grave doubt as to whether they had such an effect. Rivera, 900 F.2d at
1469-70 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). If the cumulated
errors are constitutional in nature, then "the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
announced in Chapman" is used in determining whether the defendant's substantial rights
were affected. Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also Cargle,
317 F.3d at 1206-07. Other circuits' formulation of the standard of review echoes either the
Rivera language of substantial influence on the outcome of the trial or the United States v.
Taylor language of "fundamental fairness" of the trial. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
asks whether a defendant's substantial rights were affected. United States v. Meserve, 271
F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2001). According to the Third Circuit, a new trial is required on a
cumulative error basis only when the "errors, when combined, so infected the jury's
deliberations that they had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial." United States
v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit also asks whether the
defendant's "substantial rights were affected." United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 532
(4th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit asks if the errors had a substantial influence on the
outcome of the trial. United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 418 (5th Cir. 1998). The Sixth
Circuit asks whether "the combined effect" of individually harmless errors "was so
prejudicial as to strike at the fundamental fairness of the trial." United States v. Parker, 997
F.2d 219, 222 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2004). The
Seventh Circuit asks whether "the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they
denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial." Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th
Cir. 2000) (reviewing a state conviction, but making no distinction between direct or habeas
review). The Eighth Circuit asks whether the cumulative errors "prejudicially affected the
defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial." United States v.
Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). While the Ninth Circuit does not appear
to have articulated a clear standard, its focus appears to be whether the errors so prejudiced
the defendant as to affect the jury's deliberation. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193,
201 (9th Cir. 1980). The Eleventh Circuit language echoes that of the Tenth Circuit as laid
out in Rivera. United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1100 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (asking whether
"the substantial right of the defendants were... affected by th[e] errors"). We found no
D.C. Circuit cases setting a standard for the application of a cumulative error analysis on
direct review.
133 There may be, in cases where Brady or Strickland claims are raised, another way to
achieve an overall assessment of a verdict's reliability: consider all reliability-impacting
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V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have called attention to the fact that assessments of
verdicts' reliability are being done piecemeal and, specifically, that the
scope of review of Strickland prejudice, Bagley materiality, and cumulative
harmless error analysis is not being applied as broadly as it should. Some
courts recognize this. But many courts focus on what, given the history and
character of the doctrines, we see as false distinctions. As Amsterdam and
Bruner describe, categorization is an act of meaning-making that serves a
particular function; categories become embedded over time and often cover
up truths. The first truth we seek to reveal here is that the Strickland and
Brady doctrines are principally reliability measures. The categorizations
these errors have picked up over the years have not changed that nature and
ought not obscure it. The second is that cumulative harmless error analysis,
like Strickland prejudice and Bagley materiality, can only meaningfully
function as a global inquiry.
For instance, in the wake of debate over incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, the right to counsel became categorized as a Sixth Amendment
violation. This gave state defendants greater access to counsel than they
would have achieved at the time under the Fourteenth Amendment. But it
did not dissolve the due process roots of the right to counsel. In the
application of cumulative harmless error doctrine, Brady and Strickland
violations have been categorized as multi-prong tests that do not amount to
error unless the defense proves prejudice. This purports to serve interests in
finality and preservation of constitutional law. But it obscures the universal
reliability determination that cumulative harmless error analysis, Brady, and
Strickland alike seek to achieve. Categorizations come and go. They are
never final. As planes of vision alter, characterizations are always subject
to adjustment. In this article, we have attempted to step back, to see that the
current categorizations and apples-and-oranges comparison they promote
obstruct the doctrines' unity of purpose-insuring a truly reliable verdict,
and to envision new ways of assessing verdict reliability globally, by
measuring the collective effect of reliability-impacting errors.
errors within the Strickland prejudice and Brady materiality prongs. Strickland prejudice
and Bagley materiality are not cumulative error analyses. But they are totality of the
circumstances reviews. One can argue that to fully measure the fundamental fairness of a
trial and the reliability of a verdict, considering the effect of multiple issues that affect
reliability, be they error or merely events, is necessary and a proper interpretation of the
scope of totality of the circumstances review under Strickland and Bagley as it has
descended from the fundamental fairness measure applied in Powell: assessing counsel's
performance in light of the totality of the circumstances means doing so in light of all trial
errors that affect the evidence presented to the jury and the jury's consideration of that
evidence.
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